The elder ethical writers, whether of ancient Greece and Rome or modern Europe, treated very much of what we have called the general question, and of what we have arranged as the fourth of the specific inquiries. They have shown that there is an indelible distinction between right and wrong, and their most eloquent passages are those in which they have pointed out the consequences which usually follow the good and the evil. Their grand aim was to establish both of these truths, and, having done so, they thought they had secured a deep foundation for morality. *No* doubt some of them resolved the one into the other—the Epicureans resolving all virtue into a refined love of happiness, and the Stoics speaking slightingly of happiness except in its relation to virtue. Still all the higher order of moralists sought to establish both truths. Some have maintained that we should be on our guard against looking to anything but the personal charms of virtue; and others, afraid that these might not be sufficient to fix our regards, have been fond of magnifying her patrimony; but all agree that she is to be sought after for what she is in herself, or for what she brings with her.

The other questions are also of great moment, and an answer is demanded to them by the precision expected in modern investigation.

The FIRST, or the determination of the moral faculty, must no doubt be of a psychological as well as an ethical character; but it is only, as we shall shew forthwith, by an inquiry into the facts of our moral nature, that we can hope to ascertain its principles.

It is of the utmost moment, as we shall see in the sequel, that the SECOND QUESTION, as to the qualities which must meet in virtuous action, should be kept distinct from the first, or the inquiry into the nature of the mental process, which recognises these qualities. The virtue of an agent does not

consist in the possession of the moral faculty or feeling, but in the possession of the qualities at which it looks, and of which it approves. We cannot be too frequently reminded that the possession of conscience and the possession of virtue are two different things. Conscience is the faculty, or feeling, which, on contemplating the voluntary acts of responsible beings, proclaims them to be virtuous or vicious; whereas virtue is the quality or the quali-